We study combinatorial auctions for secondary spectrum markets, where short-term communication licenses are sold to wireless nodes. Channels can be assigned to multiple bidders according to interference constraints captured by a conflict graph. We suggest a novel approach to such combinatorial auctions using a graph parameter called inductive independence number. We achieve good approximation results by showing that interference constraints for wireless networks imply a bounded inductive independence number. For example, in the physical model the factor becomes O( √ k log 2 n) for n bidders and k channels. Our algorithms can be turned into incentive-compatible mechanisms for bidders with arbitrary valuations.
INTRODUCTION
A major challenge of today's wireless networks and mobile communication is spectrum management, as devices use common frequency bands that are subject to interference between multiple transmitters in the same area. In fact, spectrum allocation has become one of the key problems that currently limits the growth and evolution of wireless networks. The reason is that, traditionally, frequencies were given away to large service providers in a static way by regulators for entire countries. Examples include FCC auctions in the US or the auctions for UMTS and LTE that took place in Europe. However, demands for services vary at different times and in different areas. Depending on time and place, this causes frequency bands licensed for one application to become overloaded. On the other hand, different bands are idle at the same time. A promising solution to this problem is to use market approaches that result in a flexible and thus more efficient redistribution of access rights, thereby overcoming the artificial shortage of available spectrum. In this case, parts of the spectrum that are currently unused by so-called primary users for the originally intended purpose (such as TV or telecommunication) can be offered to so-called secondary users. Licenses for such secondary usage are valid only for a local area.
A sustainable approach (concisely termed eBay in the Sky in Zhou et al. [2008] ) to automatically run such a secondary spectrum market is to auction licenses for secondary users on a regular basis. In this article, we propose a general framework and efficient algorithms to implement such a secondary spectrum auction. In our model, there are n secondary users who can bid for bundles of the k wireless channels. Depending on the scenario, a user can correspond to a base station that strives to cover a specific area, or a pair of devices that want to exchange data (e.g., a base station and a mobile device). In order to account for channel aggregation capabilities of modern devices, users should be able to acquire multiple channels. We allow each user v to have an arbitrary valuation b v,T for each subset T of channels. This level of generality is necessary due to the of different needs, applications, and hardware abilities of the users, but also because of different locations, spectrum availability, and interference conditions. For instance, the presence of a primary user might allow access to a channel only for a subset of mobile devices located in selected areas. We assume no restrictions on the valuation functions, not even monotonicity.
In this article, we devise approximation algorithms for spectrum allocation on the secondary market with the objective of maximizing social welfare. We focus on the underlying combinatorial problems and describe interference conflicts by means of an edge-weighted conflict graph. In unweighted graphs, the vertices represent the bidders and the edges represent conflicts such that the feasible allocations for a channel correspond to the independent sets in the conflict graph. For edge-weighted graphs, we extend the definition of independent set to weighted edges by requiring the sum of all incoming weights to be less than 1. Our formulation covers a large number of binary interference models (such as the protocol model). As we will see, edge weights allow to express more realistic models like the physical model. Here, we can even take the effects of power control into account. Before we state our results, we proceed with a formal description of our model.
A Combinatorial Framework for Spectrum Assignment
There is a set V of n users and a set [k] of k channels for wireless transmission. Depending on the application scenario, a user can be interpreted as a transmitter that strives to reach mobile devices in a specific geometric area, or a communication request consisting of a sender-receiver pair located in a metric space. We take a more fundamental approach that captures a large variety of these interpretations. We address the nature of interference by assuming that V is the vertex set of a conflict graph G = (V, E). A directed edge e ∈ E represents a possible conflict, that is, edge (u, v) indicates that channel access of user u creates a conflict at user v when both try to simultaneously access the channel. To measure the severity of the interference caused by a conflict, we later consider edge weights w(e) ≥ 0. A conflict graph is termed unweighted if w(e) ∈ {0, 1} for all e ∈ E and is edge weighted otherwise. For unweighted conflict graphs, we drop the weights and assume that e ∈ E ⇔ w(e) = 1. For simplicity of presentation, we first stick to unweighted conflict graphs. In Section 3 that follows: we present a straightfoward extension to the edge-weighted case.
A user v ⊆ V is successful on channel j if the interference from other users that try to access the channel is not too large. In unweighted conflict graphs, if a set M ⊆ V accesses the channel, user v ∈ M is successful if there is no user u ∈ M with (u, v) ∈ E. Hence, a subset of users M ⊆ V can implement simultaneous successful channel access if and only if M is an independent set in G.
Users are assumed to have valuations for successful channel access. For user v, we denote by b v,T ≥ 0 the valuation when he has successful access to channel set T ⊆ [k] . The main goal of this article is to find allocations of users to channels that maximize the valuation of successful transmissions. More formally, we try to solve the following combinatorial auction problem with conflict graph.
PROBLEM 1 (COMBINATORIAL AUCTION WITH CONFLICT GRAPH). Given a graph G = (V, E), a natural number k, and a valuation function b: V × 2 [k] → N, find a feasible allocation S : V → 2 [k] that maximizes the social welfare b(S) := v∈V b v,S(v) . An allocation S is called feasible if, for all channels j ∈ [k], the set of vertices assigned to this channel, namely {v ∈ V | j ∈ S(v)}, is an independent set.
Observe this problem generalizes combinatorial auctions in which we have to allocate a set of items to a set of users to maximize total valuation of the allocation. In our case, a channel can be thought of as an item that can be given to multiple bidders representing an independent set in the conflict graphs. To embed ordinary combinatorial auctions in our framework, we can assume the conflict graph to be an unweighted clique. Then each independent set consists only of at most one bidder, which implies that each channel/item can be given to at most one bidder. Instead, for general unweighted conflict graphs and k = 1, we obtain the standard maximum weight independent set problem.
By relying on the abstraction to conflict graphs, we can model channel assignment in a large variety of interference models, including, for example, disk graphs or protocol models. Using an appropriate extension of independent set to edge-weighted conflict graphs, we can even treat variants of the physical model of interference. We elaborate on this issue in Sections 3 and 4. However, in general graphs the maximum independent set problem is extremely hard to approximate. Fortunately, conflict graphs resulting from prominent interference models have more structure, which we capture using the following graph parameter. For simplicity, we again define the parameter only for unweighted conflict graphs. For the extension to weighted conflict graphs, see Section 3. Definition 1.1 (Inductive Independence Number ρ). For a graph G = (V, E), the inductive independence number ρ is the smallest number such that there is an ordering π of the vertices satisfying: for all v ∈ V and all independent sets M ⊆ V , we have
In words, for every vertex v ∈ V , the size of an independent set in the backward neighborhood of v, that is, the set of neighbors u of v with π (u) < π (v) , is at most ρ. As we discuss in Section 4, conflict graphs that are derived from various simple models of wireless communication with binary conflicts like, for instance, the protocol model, distance-2 matchings, or disk graphs, have ρ = O(1). The corresponding ordering π is efficiently computable in these cases. We exploit this property in our algorithms. Note that a bounded inductive independence number is significantly less stringent than bounded independence, which postulates a bound for the complete neighborhood and can increase up to n − 1 even in disk graphs.
Our Contribution
We devise the first approximation algorithms for the combinatorial auction problem with conflict graph. Our approach is based on a novel LP formulation for the independent set problem. Our main results concern the so-called physical model [Gupta and Kumar 2000] that is common in the engineering community and has also become subject to theoretical work. In binary models of wireless communication usually studied in theoretical computer science, we make the oversimplifying assumption that interference caused by a signal stops at some boundary around the sender and that receivers beyond this boundary are not disturbed by this signal. In contrast, the physical model takes into account realistic propagation effects and additivity of signals. Feasibility of simultaneous transmissions is modeled in terms of signal-to-interferenceplus-noise-ratio (SINR) constraints. We study two variants of this model, one in which signals are sent at given powers (e.g., uniform) and one where the powers are subject to optimization themselves. We show how to represent SINR constraints for both of these variants in terms of an edge-weighted conflict graph and introduce appropriate notions of "independent set" and "inductive independence number" for edge-weighted graphs.
At first, we observe that the inductive independence number ρ for edge-weighted graphs obtained from the physical model (in both variants) is bounded by O(log n) and the corresponding ordering is efficiently computable. This enables us to bypass the wellknown lower bound of (n 1−ε ) [Håstad 1999 ] on the approximability of independent set in general graphs. In particular, we present an LP relaxation capturing both interference constraints and valuations of users for subsets of channels. Similar to ordinary combinatorial auctions, the LP might require an exponential number of valuations b v,T to be explicitly written down. However, we show how to solve the LP using only oracle access to bidder valuations. Our LP-based framework is able to handle edge-weighted conflict graphs resulting from the physical model. By rounding the LP optimum, our algorithm achieves an O(ρ · √ k log n)-approximation guarantee. Combining this with the bound on ρ gives an O( √ k log 2 n)-approximation of the social welfare for spectrum auctions in the physical model (in both variants).
For more simple binary models of wireless communication such as the protocol model, our approach yields an O(ρ · √ k)-approximation. Using the bounds on ρ mentioned before, this yields an O( √ k)-approximation guarantee. In this case, we also provide some complementary hardness results. In general, it is hard to approximate the combinatorial auction problem with conflict graphs to a factor of O(ρ 1− ) and to a factor of O(k 1 2 − ) for any constant > 0. While for some specific models better approximations exist, in general the bounds provided by our algorithms for binary models cannot be improved in terms of a single parameter ρ or k. In addition, we provide stronger lower bounds for the case of asymmetric channels in which the conflict graph can be different for each channel. In this case, our algorithm guarantees a factor of O(ρ · k), the best possible in general.
Our approach can be used to derive incentive-compatible mechanisms using the LPbased randomized metarounding framework of Lavi and Swamy [2011] for general bidders with demand oracles. In fact, we slightly extend this framework by starting with an infeasible rather than feasible ILP formulation. The approximation algorithm computes a linear combination of feasible solutions approximating the optimal solution of the corresponding LP and then chooses one of these solutions at random. The obtained mechanism is truthful in expectation, that is, in expectation over the internal randomization of the mechanism, each bidder obtains maximum expected utility by reporting the true valuation, no matter what the reported valuations of other bidders.
Outline. For technical reasons, we present our results in a different order than stated earlier. We first introduce the basic approach in the context of unweighted conflict graphs in Section 2. The extensions to edge-weighted graphs, including a formal definition of inductive independence number, are given in Section 3. The aforementioned wireless models (especially the variants of the physical model) are formally introduced in Section 4, where we also show the bounds on the inductive independence number. The results on asymmetric channels are presented in Section 5. Finally, we conclude with recent progress and open problems in Section 6. The application of the randomized metarounding technique to obtain truthful mechanisms is discussed in Appendix A.
Related Work
The idea of establishing secondary spectrum markets has attracted much attention among researchers in applied networking and engineering communities [Zhou et al. 2008; Buddhikot et al. 2005; Ileri et al. 2005] . There are many different fundamental regulatory questions that need to be addressed when implementing such a market. For example, it has to be clarified who runs the market and who is allowed to sell and buy spectrum therein. Possible actors could be network providers, brokers, regulators, and end-users. In addition, it must be guaranteed that existing services are not harmed. In most of the literature on spectrum markets, the technological aspects dominate. Many results in this area are only of qualitative nature, only a few examples (such as Zhou et al. [2008] , Zhou and Zheng [2009] , and Kash et al. [2011] ) explicitly consider truthfulness. In terms of nontrivial worst-case guarantees on the efficiency of the allocation, there is some recent work on single-parameter auctions with unweighted conflict graphs [Gopinathan et al. 2011; Zhu et al. 2012] .
Using our combinatorial models based on (edge-weighted) conflict graphs taking into account the bounded inductive independence number, we put aside technological aspects and focus on the underlying combinatorial and algorithmic questions. To the best of our knowledge there is no previous work on auctions using the general framework of edge-weighted conflict graphs and nontrivial provable worst-case guarantees on the efficiency of the allocation in the multiparameter case. Subsequent to publication of an extended abstract of this article in Hoefer et al. [2011] , several special cases and refinements of the framework presented here have been treated. We address this recent progress in Section 6.
In contrast, combinatorial auctions have been a prominent research area in algorithmic game theory over the last decade. A variety of work treats auctions with special valuation functions, such as submodular valuations or ones expressible by specific bidding languages. For an introduction, see, for example, Nisan et al. [2007, Chapters 11 and 12] or Cramton et al. [2006] . In addition, designing (nontruthful) approximation algorithms for the allocation problems has found interest, most notably for submodular valuations (e.g., Vondrák [2008] and Feige and Vondrák [2006] ). More relevant to our work, however, are results that deal with truthful mechanisms for general valuations. Most notably, Lavi and Swamy [2011] and Dobzinski et al. [2012] derive mechanisms using only demand oracles that achieve an √ k-approximation with truthfulness in expectation and universal truthfulness, respectively. A deterministic truthful (k/ log k)-approximation is obtained by Holzman et al. [2004] .
Over the last decades, there has been much research on finding maximum independent sets in the context of interference models for wireless networks. One of the simplest models in this area are disk graphs, mostly analyzed using geometric arguments. See Fishkin [2003] and Gräf et al. [1998] for a summary on the results and typical techniques. Christodoulou et al. [2010] study combinatorial auctions for geometric objects. Similar to our approach, they present an LP formulation based on a property in terms of an ordering, the fatness of geometric objects.
The inductive independence number has been used before in Akcoglu et al. [2002] and Ye and Borodin [2012] to approximate independent sets within a factor of ρ with a motivation stemming from chordal graphs. However, these works do not consider multiple channels or wireless communication. As their algorithm is not monotone, it is also not directly applicable to truthful auctions.
Algorithmic aspects of the physical model have become popular in theoretical research recently, particularly the problem of scheduling, that is, partitioning a given set of requests in a small number of classes such that all requests are successful. New challenges arise since graph-theoretic coloring methods cannot be directly applied. For example, there have been a number of results on how to choose powers for short schedule lengths [Fanghänel et al. 2009 [Fanghänel et al. , 2011 Halldórsson et al. 2013] . A popular method is fixing powers according to some distance-based scheme. For uniform power assignments, a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum independent set (i.e., a maximum set that may share a single channel) is presented in Goussevskaia et al. [2009] . Near-optimal bounds for all sublinear schemes have been presented in Halldórsson and Mitra [2011] . An online version of the problem has been studied in Fanghänel et al. [2013] presenting tight bounds depending on the difference in lengths of the requests. For arbitrary power schemes, a constant-factor approximation algorithm has been obtained in Kesselheim [2011] and extended to more general scenarios in Kesselheim [2012] .
UNWEIGHTED CONFLICT GRAPHS

Our LP Relaxation
One can get a very intuitive LP formulation for the weighted independent set problem by leaving out the integer constraints from the integer linear program formulation.
Max.
This LP can be used to approximate independent set within a factor of (d + 1)/2 [Hochbaum 1983; Kako et al. 2009 ], whered is the average vertex degree. However, even for the case of a clique, the integrality gap is n /2. In contrast to this edge-based LP formulation, we herein present a different LP based on the inductive independence number ρ (recall Definition 1.1). As we will see later, in typical conflict graphs the inductive independence number is constant and the corresponding ordering π can be efficiently calculated. Here we use π (v) = {u ∈ V | {u, v} ∈ E, π(u) < π(v)} to denote the backward neighborhood of v. This allows to use the following LP relaxation that has one constraint for each combination of a vertex and a channel and another one for each vertex.
s. t.
This LP works as follows. For each vertex v and each possible set T ⊆ [k] of channels assigned to this vertex, there is one variable x v,T . Due to the bounded inductive independence number, all feasible allocations correspond to solutions of the LP. However, not all integer solutions of the LP necessarily correspond to feasible channel allocations.
Nevertheless, we will show how to compute a feasible allocation from each solution in Theorem 2.3.
LEMMA 2.1. Let S be a feasible allocation and x be defined by x v,T = 1 if S(v) = T and 0 otherwise, then x is a feasible LP solution.
PROOF. Conditions (1c) and (1d) are obviously satisfied. Let us now consider condi-
Since M is an independent set, by definition of the inductive independence number, we have
On the other hand, we have
As all coefficients are nonnegative, this LP has a packing structure. In particular, we can observe the following decomposition property.
Observation 2.2. Let x be a feasible solution to the LP and let x
(1) be a vector such that 0 ≤ x
(1) and x (2) := x − x (1) are feasible LP solutions as well.
If there are only polynomially many valuations b v,T nonzero, this LP is solvable in polynomial time. In general, due to the number of subsets, the elementary representation of the b v,T values is exponential in k. We can still solve the LP optimally if bidders can be represented by demand oracles.
Demand Oracles
If there is an arbitrary number of channels, we must define an appropriate way to query the valuation functions of the requests, as an elementary description becomes prohibitively large. A standard way to deal with this issue in the auction literature is the representation by so-called demand oracles. To query the demand oracle of bidder v, we assign each channel i a price p i . Then the oracle delivers his "demand"
, namely a bundle that maximizes the utility of v, given that he pays the sum of prices of channels in the bundle. In ordinary combinatorial auctions, such demand oracles can be used to separate the dual of the underlying LP. We next show that such demand oracles can also be used for the solution of our LP (1). Consider the dual given by Min.
v∈V j∈ [k] 
In contrast to ordinary combinatorial auctions, we cannot use the solution (y, z) directly as the channel prices. Instead, we choose bidder-specific channel prices by
Using this idea, we see that the constraints of the dual are indeed equivalent to upper bounds on the utility with bidder-specific channel prices. By obtaining the demand bundle with highest utility for each player, we find a violated constraint or verify that none exists. This allows to separate the dual LP and to solve it efficiently using the ellipsoid method. This way, we get an equivalent primal LP with only polynomially many constraints. (1) and x (2) by x
with probability
return the better one of the solutions S (1) and S
Rounding LP Solutions
Having described the LP relaxation, we now analyze Algorithm 1 computing feasible allocations from LP solutions as follows. First, it decomposes the given LP solution to two solutions x (1) and x (2) (line 1). In x (1) all fractional variables x v,T for sets T with |T | ≥ √ k are set to zero. To get x (2) , the exact opposite is performed. From each one, a feasible allocation is computed and the better one is selected at the end. This means the algorithm either allocates only sets of size at most √ k or only of size at least √ k. The actual computation of the allocation works the same way for both LP solutions. It consists of two major parts: a rounding stage and a conflict resolution stage. In the rounding stage (lines 3 and 4), a tentative allocation is generated as follows. For each vertex v the set of allocated channels S (l) (v) is determined independently at random. Each set T = ∅ is taken with probability x
kρ and with the remaining probability the empty set is allocated.
Conflicts can occur when two adjacent vertices share the same channel. In this case, the conflict is resolved (lines 5-8) by allocating the channel to the vertex with smaller index in the π ordering. The other vertex is removed from the solution by being allocated the empty set. 
PROOF. The allocations S
(1) and S (2) are obviously feasible allocations because, if
Therefore the output is also a feasible allocation.
Let us now bound the expected values of solutions S (1) and S (2) . Let l ∈ {1, 2} be fixed. Let X v,T be a 0/1 random variable indicating if S (l) (v) is set to T after the rounding stage. Clearly, we have
Let X v,T be a 0/1 random variable indicating if S (l) (v) is set to T after the conflict resolution stage. We consider the event that X v,T = 0, given that X v,T = 1, namely that v is removed in the conflict resolution stage after having survived the rounding stage. LEMMA 2.4. The probability of being removed in the conflict resolution stage after having survived the rounding stage is at most 1 /2, that is, Pr [X v,T 
PROOF. The event can only occur if X u,T = 1 for some u ∈ V with π (u) < π(v), {u, v} ∈ E, and T ∩ T = ∅. In terms of the random variables X u,T , this is
Using this notation we can bound the probability of the event by using Markov's inequality
We will now show separately that this expectation is at most 1 /2 for each of the two possible values of l (l = 1 or l = 2).
Due to linearity of expectation, this is equal to
Using Eq. (3) and the fact that x (1) is an LP solution, this is
Recall that we only have to deal with sets T for which |T | ≤ √ k in this case. Hence, the expectation is at most 1 /2 and so is the probability that v is removed in the conflict resolution stage.
Case 2 (l = 2). In this case, we have X u,T > 0 only for sets T with |T | ≥ √ k. This yields, for all u ∈ V ,
So, we get
Again, we use linearity of expectation, Eq. (3), and the fact that x (2) is an LP solution. This gives us
This bounds the probability for the second case.
In both cases we have Pr [X v,T 
Using Lemma 2.4 and Eq. (3) we get, for all v ∈ V and
This yields that both calculated solutions S (l) for l ∈ {1, 2} have expected value
The better one of the two solutions has expected value
Hardness Results
In this section we provide lower bounds for the approximation ratios of our algorithms. This shows that, in general, the preceding results cannot be significantly improved without further restricting the model. Our results are based on the hardness of approximating independent set in bounded-degree graphs [Trevisan 2001] PROOF. Such an algorithm could be used to approximate independent set in boundeddegree graphs. Given a graph with maximum degree d, its inductive independence number ρ is also at most d. Trevisan [2001] shows there is no d /2
As a second result, we can also prove that the impact of the number of channels k has to be as large as √ k.
THEOREM 2.6. Even for ρ = 1 there is no k 1 2 −ε -approximation algorithm unless ZPP = NP.
Our framework extends general combinatorial auctions with k items, a standard result in the area [Nisan et al. 2007, Chapter 9] derived from the hardness of independent set in general graphs.
In conclusion, our algorithmic results are supported by almost matching lower bounds in each parameter. Without further restricting the graph properties (which means using additional properties of an interference model), no significantly better approximation guarantees can be achieved in terms of ρ (respectively, k). However, this does not prove that no O(ρ + √ k) approximation can exist.
In this section we extend conflicts over binary relations (conflict/no-conflict). In wireless communication, we encounter situations in which a radio transmission is exposed to interference by a number of devices relatively far away. If there were only a single one of them, interference would be acceptable but their overall interference is too high. For such aggregation aspects we introduce edge-weighted conflict graphs in which there is a nonnegative weight w (u, v) between any pair of vertices u, v ∈ V . If a subset I ⊆ V of users accesses a channel j, then user v ∈ I is successful on j if u∈I w(u, v) < 1. Put differently, a subset I ⊆ V of users can implement successful simultaneous access to a channel if they form an independent set in G, where the following definition captures our condition of success and extends the standard definition of independent set to edge-weighted conflict graphs.
Definition 3.1. For a set of users V with weight function w :
Note that, edge weights need not be symmetric. To generalize the definition of the inductive independence number, it is therefore convenient to use the following symmetric edge weightsw (u, v) = w(u, v) + w(v, u) . This allows us to argue over the sum of degrees in Lemma 3.4. The approximation guarantee is only increased by a factor of 2 through this step. In practice, it might be more convenient to use a maximum instead of the sum forw. 
Note that, in this definition, the sets M are only required to be independent sets with respect to the original edge weights w, not necessarilyw. Therefore, any feasible allocation corresponds to a solution of the following LP relaxation.
For the case that valuations are only given by demand oracles, this LP can be solved in polynomial time in a similar way as described in Section 2.2. In the case of unweighted conflict graphs, we could ensure feasibility by guaranteeing that no node has neighbors with a smaller index in the π -ordering. For weighted graphs, resolving conflicts in only one direction only with respect to the π -ordering is not enough. In particular, even if the edge weights to neighboring vertices on the same channel with smaller indices are at most 1, the edge weights to all neighboring vertices on the same channel can be more than 1. While a feasible independent set requires to fulfill the latter condition, a feasible integer solution to the LP might only satisfy the former one, as the conflicts with respect to backwards neighbors are those represented in the constraints. (1) and x (2) by x
return the better one of the allocations S (1) and S
To cope with this issue, we increase the scaling by another factor of 2. We use rounding and conflict resolution as previously to ensure that, for each vertex v, the sum of edge weights to neighboring vertices that have smaller indices and share a channel with v is at most 1 /2. Formally, a partly feasible allocation is an allocation S : V → 2 [k] such that
Rounding LP solutions to such partly feasible allocations can be carried out in a similar way as Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 decomposes the given LP solution the same way as Algorithm 1 and, after-wards, also performs two stages. In the rounding stage (lines 2-4), again a tentative allocation is determined randomly by considering the LP solution as a probability distribution. Subsequently, only a partial conflict resolution (lines 5-8) is performed: If for some vertex v the sum of edge weights to neighbors that have lower π values and share a channel exceeds 1 /2, it is removed from the solution (i.e., it is allocated the empty set). Such a partly feasible solution satisfies Eq. (5). 
PROOF. The allocation is partly feasible since both allocations S
(1) and S (2) satisfy condition (5).
For the value of the solution, let us again bound the value of the partly feasible allocations S
(1) and S (2) . Again, let us fix l ∈ {1, 2}. Let X v,T be a 0/1 random variable indicating if S (l) (v) is set to T after the rounding stage. This time, we have
Let X v,T be a 0/1 random variable indicating if S (l) (v) is set to T after the partial conflict-resolution stage. Again, we consider the event in which X v,T = 0, given that X v,T = 1, that is, that v is removed in the conflict-resolution stage after having survived the rounding stage.
To bound the probability that a vertex is removed in the partial conflict resolution, we observe
due to Markov's inequality and linearity of expectation. Like in the proof of Lemma 2.4, E[X u,T ] is again defined in terms of x (l) and x (l) is a feasible LP solution. Therefore, we can apply the arguments used in the proof of Lemma 2.4 in an analogous way and obtain that Pr [X v,T 
. Thus we can conclude that, for l ∈ {1, 2}, we have
v,T . The expected value of the output is at least
Given a partly feasible allocation S, Algorithm 3 implements the necessary additional conflict resolution to derive a fully feasible one. The algorithm decomposes the partly feasible allocation to a number of feasible candidate allocations S 1 , S 2 , . . . . Each allocation S i is initialized such that S i (v) = S(v) if vertex v has been removed from all previous allocations S 1 , . . . , S i−1 . Otherwise S i (v) = ∅. Then a conflict resolution is performed on S i : The vertices are considered by decreasing indices in the π -ordering. If the weight bound is satisfied and the vertex is conflict free, it is assigned to the current allocation S i and thus removed from the set V of remaining vertices. Otherwise, if the bound is violated, it stays in the set of remaining vertices V and removed from S i by allocating the empty set. At the end, the best one of the candidate allocations S i is returned. We will see that each candidate allocation allocates at least half of the remaining vertices a nonempty set. Therefore, at most log 2 n candidates are computed and the best one has value at least b(S) / log 2 n .
LEMMA 3.4. Given a (not necessarily feasible) allocation S in which condition (5) is fulfilled for all v ∈ V , Algorithm 3 calculates a feasible allocation of value at least b(S)
/ log 2 n . PROOF. Obviously, by construction all candidates are feasible and so is the output allocation. Next, we prove that we need at most log 2 n iterations of the while loop by showing that in each iteration at most half of the remaining vertices are removed from the allocation. This means the cardinality of V is at least halved in each iteration. Intuitively, in each iteration, even if all surviving nodes are assumed to be in the independent set, for at least half of them the condition for independence is fulfilled with respect to their complete neighborhood. Formally, this will be a result of the more stringent right-hand sides to the LP constraints and Markov inequality applied to the degrees of nodes. This shows that we can partition S into O(log n) feasible independent sets. More formally, let V i be the set V after the ith iteration of the while loop; V 0 = V . Let us fix i ∈ N, and v ∈ V i+1 . We know that v has been removed from S i by the algorithm. Denoting by S i the current state of S i while the algorithm considers v, this only happens if
Since Eq. (5) is obviously also satisfied for S i , it has to be
For a vertex u ∈ V i with π (u) > π(v) we know that the vertex has either been removed from the allocation before (then u ∈ V i+1 ) or stays in S i (i.e., S i (u) = S i (u) = S(u) and u / ∈ V i+1 ). Hence
Combining these two insights, we get a necessary condition, namely, that if v ∈ V i+1 then
where
On the other hand, we can change the ordering of the sums and use the symmetry of the weightsw to get
where the last bound is due to condition (5). In combination this yields
|V i |, meaning less than half of the remaining vertices are removed from the partly feasible allocation in each iteration. So, since |V 0 | = n, we can conclude that |V i | < 1 2 i · n. Therefore we get |V log 2 n | < 1. Thus the algorithm terminates within log 2 n steps.
By definition, for all vertices S i (v) = S(v) for exactly one i ∈ [ log 2 n ] and
This yields for the value of the output
As a consequence, the computed feasible allocation has a value that in expectation is at most an O( √ kρ log n) factor smaller than that of the optimal LP solution.
APPLICATIONS
In the previous sections we have described a general algorithmic approach to channel allocation problems when the underlying conflict graph has bounded inductive independence number. Here we will show that this property is particularly widespread among models for interference in wireless communication. Our aim is not to prove optimal bounds in each case, but to show why we believe a bounded inductive independence number to be a key insight for understanding algorithmic problems in wireless networking. The concept of conflict graphs can be applied in two basic scenarios. On the one hand, the task could be to allocate channels to transmitters. Each transmitter intends to cover a certain area for example, a base station in a cellular network. The interference model defines which transmitters can be assigned the same channels. On the other hand, instead of single transmitters, one can consider pairs of network nodes (links) that act as sender and receiver. In such a scenario, "users" are not single network nodes but links. Therefore, the vertices of the conflict graph are links and edges define which links can be assigned the same channels.
The following represents a selected set of prominent models. We discuss further examples in Appendix B.
Transmitter Scenarios
A very simple yet instructive model for a transmitter scenario is as follows. We have n transmitters located in the plane at points p 1 , . . . , p n ∈ R 2 . Each of the transmitters has a transmission range r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ R >0 . Transmitters may be assigned the same channel if their transmission ranges do not intersect. Under these conditions, the interference constraints can be modeled by a disk graph. There is an edge between two vertices if the transmission-range disks around the corresponding receivers intersect. PROOF. Let G = (V, E) be a disk graph and π be the ordering of vertices by decreasing radius of the corresponding disk. So, in other words, V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } with r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ · · · ≥ r n , where r i is the radius of the disk around v i . If the disk representation is given, this ordering can be computed in polynomial time by simply sorting the vertices. Let v ∈ V and M ⊆ V be an independent set in G. By definition of the ordering, we have for all u ∈ M ∩ π (v) that the radius is at least r π (v) .
To show |M ∩ π (v i )| ≤ 5, we assume |M ∩ π (v i )| ≥ 6. This would yield that there were two vertices v j and v k whose angles seen from v i were at most 60
• . The distance between the centers of v j and v k would therefore be no larger than the larger ones of the two distances between the centers of v i and v j or v i and v k . As r j ≥ r i and r k ≥ r i , this implies that disks around v j and v k intersect. So, there has to be an edge between these two vertices. This contradicts the assumption that M is an independent set and thereby proves the claim.
Unweighted Link-Based Scenarios
There are a number of different interference models for link-based scenarios that can be described by some unweighted conflict graph. They are often called graph-based interference models but, to avoid ambiguities, we refer to them as binary interference models. Due to their large variety, we have to confine ourselves to some selected examples.
Probably the best known binary model is the protocol model [Gupta and Kumar 2000] . 
Physical Model
The models mentioned previously go well with graph-theoretic concepts. However, radio transmissions typically decrease asymptotically with increasing distance. The physical model captures this property much more accurately and is particularly widespread among engineers. Even though the physical model does not fit in the traditional binary graph-theoretic context, it has similar properties that allow it to be expressed using edge-weighted conflict graphs.
In this model, network nodes are located in a metric space. The received signal strength decreases as the distance increases. If a node transmits at a power level p, the signal strength at a distance of d is p /d α , for a constant α. A transmission is received successfully if ratio of the received signal strength of the intended transmission and the stengths of concurrent transmissions plus ambient noise is above some constant threshold β > 0. More formally, given pairs of senders s i and receivers r i that transmit at power level p i , receiver r i can decode the signal from sender s i successfully if the SINR constraint
Here M is the set of links transmitting at the same time on the same channel and ν ≥ 0 a constant expressing ambient noise.
Note that we can easily reduce the model to a conflict graph if transmission powers are fixed. Prominent and simple classes of power assignments p:
α ) assignments. More generally, we can consider assignments satisfying the following monotonicity constraints. For link we denote by d( ) the distance between sender and receiver of link .
In other words, if the distance between a sender and a receiver is larger, the absolute power is higher (or equal), whereas the received power is smaller (or equal). We furthermore assume that each sender uses slightly more power than would be necessary to reach its receiver in the presence of only ambient noise but no interference. This is formalized as PROOF. We choose the edges of the conflict graph to have the following weights. For = (s, r), = (s , r ) we set
By this definition, for any set of links M and any = (s , r ), we have that s,r) α . This is in turn equivalent to this SINR condition: Any set fulfilling the SINR condition also fulfills this inequality as ε is strictly greater than 0. However, as any term in the sum is larger than s,r) α , it cannot occur that only a strict subset of M is SINR feasible. So a set M fulfills the SINR constraint iff it corresponds to an independent set in the edge-weighted graph.
Note that, apart from the factor, the edge weights are equal to the notion of affectance a p in Kesselheim and Vöcking [2010] , for which we have the following result. Recall that d( ) denotes the distance between sender and receiver of link . Kesselheim and Vöcking [2010] 
. If M is a set of links that can concurrently transmit and is another link with d(
) ≤ d( ) for all ∈ M, then ∈M a p ( , ) = O(1) and ∈M a p ( , ) = O(log n).
This immediately yields the edge-weighted graph to have an inductive independence number ρ = O(log n).
While these bounds hold for general metric spaces, Halldórsson et al. [2013] have recently provided tight bounds of O(log log ) on the inductive independence number in the physical model with square-root power assignment and Euclidean distance, where is the ratio of longest and shortest distance among any sender-receiver pair.
Interestingly, we can also use our approach if transmission powers are not given upfront. In this case, our algorithm has to decide about the assignment of links to channels and which transmission powers to use for each link. The first part is solved by LP rounding as before. In the LP we use edge weights ensuring that there is a feasible power assignment for the computed set of links. The second task of power assignment can then be done using a power control procedure by Kesselheim [2011] .
Note that, in contrast to the interference models mentioned before, in this case not all feasible solutions (i.e., feasibly scheduled sets of links) correspond to independent sets in the weighted graph. However, for our argument it suffices to observe that each set of feasible links corresponds to an LP solution for some ρ and that integral LP solutions with ρ = 1 also correspond to feasible sets of links. Combining these insights with the bounds in Kesselheim [2011] and those we proved previously, we obtain the following result. THEOREM 4.5. There is a choice of edge weights such that our algorithm in combination with the power control procedure in Kesselheim [2011] achieves an O( √ k log n) approximation in fading metrics (see Halldórsson [2013] ) and an O( √ k log 2 n) approximation in general metrics.
PROOF. We define the weighted graph as follows. The set of vertices is again the set of all links R. Let π be the ordering from large to small distances between the sender and its receiver.
, set the weight between two links = (s, r) and = (s , r ) to
otherwise . Kesselheim [2011] states that, for each independent set in the weighted graph, the power-control algorithm calculates a feasible set of links.
On the other hand, Theorem 1 in Kesselheim [2011] shows that, under the aforesaid edge weights, each feasible set of links is also an LP solution for some ρ = O(1) in fading metrics. Theorem 7 in Kesselheim [2011] shows ρ = O(log n) in general metrics.
In conclusion, this implies that by applying our rounding algorithm to the LP using the previously defined weights, we get a solution to which we can apply the power assignment of Kesselheim [2011] to obtain a feasible set of links. The resulting allocation is an O( √ k log n)-approximation for fading metrics and an O( √ k log 2 n)-approximation in general metrics.
ASYMMETRIC CHANNELS
Thus far, channels have been symmetric in terms of interference, which means the same interference model is applied to each channel. In a more general setting, for each of the k channels, a different edge set E j , (respectively, a different edge-weight function w j ) for the interference graph is given. Then we have an edge-weight functionw j for each channel j ∈ [k]. The preceding LP relaxation can be easily adapted by exchanginḡ w withw j in the constraints (1b). In contrast, the analysis of the rounding algorithms internally depends on the assumption of symmetric channels: We used symmetry when reordering the sums in the proof of Lemma 2.4.
However, when exchanging the probability for a vertex v to choose set T by x
v,T/4kρ), the proof of Lemma 2.4 can be carried out the same way without using the symmetry. Hence, for the asymmetric case, we lose a factor of O(k · ρ) (respectively O(k · ρ · log n)) in the LP rounding step. This represents our approximation ratio. The result may seem like a trivial generalization of the k = 1 case. However, this is not true as multiple graphs make the problem much harder. We can justify the approximation factor by a hardness bound. It shows that, for asymmetric channels, our algorithms are close to optimal, but without making further assumptions about the interference model. PROOF. Again, such an algorithm could be used to approximate the independent set problem in bounded-degree graphs. Given a graph G = (V, E) with maximum degree d, we construct k graphs G 1 = (V, E 1 ) , . . . , G k = (V, E k ), each having an inductive independence number of ρ = d /k. For simplicity of notation, we assume this is an integer.
Let {v 1 , . . . , v n } be an arbitrary ordering of the vertices. We now distribute the edges from E to the edge sets E 1 , . . . , E k . For a vertex v i the incident edges to vertices v j of lower index are distributed such that each edge set gets at most ρ such edges. Since the maximum vertex degree is d, this is always possible. The valuations for the vertices are chosen such that, for all vertices b v,T is 1 only for T = [k] and 0 otherwise.
By this construction, allocations of valuation b exactly correspond to independent sets of size b. Thus, such an approximation algorithm cannot exist unless P = NP.
RECENT PROGRESS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this article we present a general framework for secondary spectrum auctions addressing spectrum redistribution problems that represent a major obstacle to the development of wireless networking technology today. Our approach of using conflict graphs with bounded inductive independence number offers application to a wide variety of interference models. This allows to extend combinatorial auctions by assigning items/channels to independent sets of bidders.
Recently, we have improved the results for practically relevant classes of valuation functions b (v, T ) [Hoefer and Kesselheim 2012] . In these classes we can significantly reduce the dependence on the number k of channels. While for symmetric valuations we obtain an algorithm with a bound of O(ρ · (log n+ log k)), for submodular matroid-ranksum valuations we even reach O(ρ · log n), thereby completely dropping the dependence on k.
For general valuations, by spending a logarithmic factor, we can strengthen the truthfulness guarantee to a notion based on stochastic dominance, which is stronger than truthfulness in expectation used in this article and Hoefer and Kesselheim [2012] . The algorithm presented in uses a fractional oversampling technique that replaces the LP optimum by a more structured solution, that is then decomposed and rounded by randomized metarounding.
The metarounding framework allows an elegant transformation of approximation algorithms into mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. However, it requires repeated application of the ellipsoid method, which is prohibitive in practice. Very recently, we have applied random sampling techniques ] to obtain simple and quick mechanisms for the case of single-parameter valuations. While we lose a logarithmic factor in the approximation guarantee, the resulting mechanisms are even universally truthful, that is, they remain truthful even if we publish the internal random coin flips of the algorithm in advance.
Some open problems in this domain are as follows. How can we extend known algorithms for (important classes of) ordinary combinatorial auctions, or develop new techniques for secondary spectrum auctions? Our recent work shows promising first steps for techniques based on fractional oversampling and random sampling. Can we use other techniques for spectrum auctions, improve the guarantees, or obtain tight inapproximability results?
For truthfulness we use randomized metarounding and the ellipsoid method. Can this be avoided to make algorithms more applicable in practice? In particular, can we derive universally or deterministically truthful mechanisms with nontrivial guarantees that go beyond the special cases of Kesselheim [2012, 2013] ?
Another direction is to show that other interference models fit into our framework and prove tight bounds on the inductive independence number resulting from such models.
Finally, the inductive independence number itself represents a natural property of unweighted and weighted graphs that is still quite poorly understood.
APPENDIXES A. MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section we show how to apply the randomized metarounding framework [Lavi and Swamy 2011 ] to obtain a truthful mechanism for the problem in which the valuations for the allocations are private information. We only highlight the main ideas of this technique and the most important observations that allow the use for our problem.
The main idea of the approach is to decompose an optimal LP solution x * into a set of polynomially many integral solutions with the following property. For each integral solution we determine a probability and the expected social welfare of a randomly chosen solution according to the probabilities is exactly b * /α, where in our case α = 8 · √ k· ρ. Given such a decomposition, we can use scaled VCG payments to implement a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation. For an accessible presentation of the complete technique, see Nisan et al. [2007, Chapter 12] or Lavi and Swamy [2011] .
In particular, for simplicity let us first consider only a constant number of channels; the adjustment to an arbitrary number of channels is treated later. We ask the vertices to obtain all valuations for all channel bundles and solve the corresponding LP (interference information is assumed publicly available). Note that at this point we are given the optimal solution to an infeasible LP. We set up a decomposition LP with exponentially many variables-one for each feasible integral solution-that represent our desired probabilities. This LP has polynomially many constraints but exponentially many variables. We can construct the dual with polynomially many variables and exponentially many constraints. The variables can be interpreted as valuations in an adjusted combinatorial auction problem. If this problem has an algorithm that verifies an integrality gap, we obtain a separation oracle and can solve the dual decomposition LP in polynomial time. In particular, it allows us to construct an equivalent LP with a polynomial number of constraints, namely the ones corresponding to the solutions obtained by our algorithm. For this polynomial-sized dual we construct the primal and determine the polynomially many probabilities of the solutions found by our algorithm, thereby completing the decomposition.
It remains to verify that our algorithms provide integral solutions within the desired integrality gap of α for the adjusted combinatorial auction problems using dual variables as valuations. We note here that our algorithms bound the integrality gap of LP (1) and (4) and can be derandomized using the technique of pairwise independence. In this way, given an optimal LP solution x * we can obtain an integral solution of value at least b * /α. Note that our LPs describe, in fact, relaxations of the combinatorial auction problem with conflict graphs, because conditions (1b) and (4b) allow each vertex to have multiple neighbors on the same channel. An arbitrary integral solution to the LP might thus be infeasible for the original problem. This is even more severe in the case of the physical model with power control, where even the interpretation of edge weights is significantly disconnected from the actual interference received. However, our algorithms produce feasible integral solutions with the desired gap to the infeasible fractional optimum. Thus, they also prove the gap for a potential fractional optimum to the LP describing the (more constrained) exact combinatorial auction problem with conflict graphs in the respective cases. The remaining arguments can be adapted from Lavi and Swamy [2011] almost without adjustment.
In the case of an arbitrary number of channels, we can use demand oracles to solve the LPs. This results in only a polynomial number of (nonzero) variables for the LP and for the dual of the decomposition LP. Note that the procedure to separate the dual of the decomposition LP does not require demand oracles. In fact, the complete decomposition procedure can be carried out without accessing the original bidder valuations.
B. BOUNDING THE INDUCTIVE INDEPENDENCE NUMBER IN INTERFERENCE MODELS
Another example for the transmitter scenario is the so-called distance-2 coloring. In contrast to the preceding model, not only must the neighbors (with intersecting disks) be on different channels, but also their neighbors. Distance-2 coloring is a common model for transmitter scenarios. Here, we analyze the restriction on two graph classes. We refer the reader to Krumke et al. [2001] for the exact definitions and a discussion of the model. We can prove ρ = O(1) as well in this case. PROOF. Without loss of generality, we assume the surrounding disks to have radius exactly r. By scaling them down and moving them inside their original area, they still do not intersect each other. By moving them to the respective closest location to D, they still intersect D.
The disks of radius r are fully contained within the disk of radius kr + 2r around the center of D. Each takes an area of πr 2 , whereas the available area is only π (ar + 2r) 2 . So, the number of surrounding disks is at most π (ar + 2r) 2 /πr 2 = (a + 2) 2 .
PROPOSITION B.2. For distance-2 coloring in disk graphs, the associated conflict graph has an inductive independence number ρ = O(1).
PROOF. As for disk graphs, we order the vertices by decreasing ranges. Now consider a vertex v and a conflicting vertex u of larger range. This vertex can either be directly connected to v (there are at most 5 ones of this kind) or via an intermediate vertex u . If the r u < r v is smaller, we see that the disk of radius r u around u intersects the one of radius 2r v around v. The prior lemma yields that there can be at most a constant number of such vertices. For the case r u ≥ r v , we take into consideration the disks around the intermediate vertices also do not intersect. So, there can be at most 5 intermediate vertices and as many conflicting vertices. The total number of conflicting vertices is constant. PROPOSITION B.3. For distance-2 coloring in (r, s)-civilized graphs, the inductive independence number of the associated conflict graph is ρ ≤ (4r/s + 2).
PROOF. In this case, the ordering does not matter. Therefore, we do not need to know the geometric representation of the graph.
Consider a vertex v and a set of vertices M conflicting with v but not with each other. Since the path length from v to each vertex in M is at most 2, the distance in the plane is at most 2r. Now consider disks around the vertices in M, each of radius s /2. By definition of the (r, s)-civilized graph, these disks do not intersect each other. However, each of them intersects a disk of radius 2r around v. Applying the previous lemma, we see there are at most (4r/s + 2) 2 such disks.
As a matter of fact ρ has to depend on this ratio of r and s. Obviously, all graphs can be represented as (r, s)-civilized if the ratio r and s is unbounded. However, our algorithm's running time does not depend on r and s. Therefore, the approximation factor has to depend on them.
Finally, we discuss another link-based approach of distance-2 matching [Balakrishnan et al. 2004] . In this case, two edges e = e may be allocated to the same channel if there are at least two edges on any connecting path. Typically, results are restricted to certain graph classes because, in general, approximating maximum distance-2 matchings is hard. For disk graphs, we can also show that the corresponding conflict graph has ρ = O(1). Interestingly, for distance-2 matching there is already an algorithm and analysis based on the observation that the inductive independence number is bounded, but the concepts are differently termed. Barrett et al. [2006] analyze a greedy approach to find a maximum independent set. For a link e = (u, v), they define r(e) = r(u) + r(v), where r(u) and r(v) are the radius of the disk surrounding u (respectively, v). The algorithm orders the links by increasing values of r(e). The key observation is now that, for all links e, the maximum number of links of higher index that collide with e but not with each other is O(1). This immediately yields ρ = O(1).
COROLLARY B.4. For distance-2 matching in disk graphs the associated conflict graph has an inductive independence number ρ = O(1).
Analyses of greedy algorithms are often carried out in a similar manner. Such arguments already suffice to bound the inductive independence number. There is plenty of opportunity to further extend our results by similar observations.
C. THEOREMS USED IN THE PROOF OF THEOREM 4.5
Theorems 1 and 7 in Kesselheim [2011] provide necessary conditions for admissible sets. These are sets of links for which there is a power assignment such that the SINR constraint is fulfilled. Theorem 3 in Kesselheim [2011] gives a sufficient condition for a set to be admissible. In more detail, it states a condition under which the power-control procedure stated in Kesselheim [2011] succeeds. Instead of using this procedure, the power assignment could also be computed by directly solving the linear equation system.
